Abstract. This paper investigates the two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) with perfect forward security. Currently, there exist no authenticated key exchange protocols which are provably secure in eCK model and meanwhile achieve perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. We propose a new two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol which enjoys following desirable properties. First, our protocol is shown secure in the eCK model under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. Moreover, our protocol does not use the NAXOS transformation, the drawback of which will be discussed in the introduction. Second, under the same assumption, we prove that our protocol achieves perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is first two-pass (one round) AKE protocol provably secure in the eCK model and achieving perfect forward security against active adversary.
Introduction
Key exchange (KE) protocol enables two parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), to establish a shared session key over an insecure channel. Later, the session key can be used to ensure data confidentiality and integrity between A and B using efficient symmetric encryptions and message authentication codes.
Since the classic Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is only secure against a passive adversary, much of work has been dedicated to armor the DH protocol against active, man-in-the-middle attacks. This is the goal of authenticated key exchange (AKE) in which both parties are assured that no other parties aside from their intended peers may learn the established session key.
The authenticated key exchange protocols have been established to be surprisingly difficult to design. The traditional trial-and-error design method has led to the situation that the protocols have been broken or the flaws in the protocols have taken many years to discover. In last years, attentions have been focused on the development of rigorous security models for authenticated key exchange.
Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [9, 10] presented a new security model for authenticated key exchange protocols, the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model in which the adversary's ability is extended to the extent such that it is allowed to reveal any static private key and ephemeral private key of parties involved except for both static private key and ephemeral private key of one of parties involved. To achieve eCK security, they introduce so called NAXOS transformation which requires that the ephemeral public key X is computed as X = g H(x,a) instead of X = g x , where x, a are ephemeral private key and static private key respectively. However, it seems that NAXOS transformation does not prevent the leakage of the ephemeral DH exponents. In some scenarios, we do not guarantee that leakages on DH exponents cannot occur [14] . On the other hand, constructing the authenticated key exchange protocol secure in eCK model without NAXOS transformation has its advantages. For example, it can reduce the risk of leakage of the static private key and use of the random oracle [7] .
An important property not captured by the two-pass AKE protocols secure in eCK model is perfect forward security (PFS) against active adversary. Recall that PFS guarantees that the leakages on the static private keys of both parties involved do not compromise the previously established session keys by these parties. However, as observed in [8] , no two-pass AKE protocols with basic DH message can achieve PFS, if the adversary is actively involved with the choice of the DH values X, Y at a session. So the best the two-pass AKE protocols with DH message can achieve is the weak form of perfect forward security (wPFS), which guarantees security against the passive adversary.
Based on Okamoto-Tanaka's work [4] , Gennaro, Krawczyk and Rabin propose a two-pass AKE protocol called mOT [5] . While preserving the communication complexity of a basic DH (two messages with a single group element per message), they prove that mOT protocol achieves PFS security against active adversary under a non-standard knowledge of exponent assumption (KEA1) [1] . However, mOT protocol does not resist the ephemeral key query attack, i.e, mOT protocol is insecure in the eCK model. In fact, the design of two-pass AKE protocol with PFS secure against the ephemeral key query attack is one of the open problems in [5] .
Our Contributions
In this paper we investigates two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol with perfect forward security. While there have already been some two-pass AKE protocols [9, 15, 6, 11, 7] provably secure in the eCK model, none of them achieve perfect forward security against active adversary. Although it is possible to transform a two-pass AKE protocol provably secure in eCK model into a three-pass AKE protocol with perfect forward security against active adversary by adding two messages [2, 8] , the resulting protocol have a higher round-complexity. This paper proposes a new two-pass (one round) authenticated key exchange protocol in the eCK model with PFS property. The key ingredient of our protocol is that instead of a single group element per message, we use two group elements in each message. With this relaxation, our protocol enjoys following desirable properties. First, without the NAXOS transformation our protocol is shown secure in the eCK model under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. There are very few AKE protocols provably secure in the eCK model which do not use NAXOS transformation. Second, under the same assumption, we prove that our two-pass (one round) protocol achieves perfect forward security against active adversary. The proof of mOT protocol for PFS active adversary needs the non-standard KEA1 assumption and is comparatively more complicated. While the mOT protocol achieves optimal communication complexity as the basic Diffie-Hellman, i.e, a single group element per message, from a practical point of view our protocol with two group element per message does not increase communication overhead too much. Comparatively, the merit of our protocol is that the security does not rely on the KEA1 assumption and the proof is straightforward and hence simpler.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is first two-pass (one round) AKE protocol which is provably secure in the eCK model and achieves perfect forward security against active adversary.
Organization
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related building techniques. Section 3 introduces a new two-pass AKE protocol with perfect forward security. Section 4 gives the full security proof of our protocol in the eCK model. Section 5 is dedicated to the proof of the PFS security of our protocol. Section 6 compares our protocol with several popular AKE protocols in term of efficiency, security model and underlying hardness assumptions. Finally, concluding remarks are made in section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present several established tools needed in this paper.
Computational Diffie-Helleman (CDH) Assumption
Let the value κ be the security parameter. Let G = g be a cyclic group of prime order q and g ∈ G be the generator. Define CDH(U,
where u, v ∈ Z q and (κ) is negligible. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of A, the choice of g and the random choices of u, v in Z q .
Gap Diffie-Helleman (GDH) assumption [13]
Let G = g be the cyclic group of order q, and DDH(.) be a decisional DiffieHelleman (DDH) oracle for G. Then, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A,
where u, v ∈ Z q , and where (k) is negligible. The DDH(.) denotes that A has oracle access to DDH, which given a quadruple (g, U = g u , V = g v , W = g w ) of elements in G, outputs 1 if w = uv mod q and 0 otherwise. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of A, the choice of g and the random choices of u, v in Z q .
Strongly Secure One Round Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Perfect Forward Security
In this section, we propose a new one round AKE protocol with perfect forward security.
Protocol Setup.
Let the value κ be the security parameter. Let G = g be a cyclic group of order q in which decisional Diffe-Helleman (DDH) problem can be efficiently solved. Let g ∈ G be a generator and G * be the non-identity elements set of G.
κ be two hash functions. The party Alice(Â)'s static private key is a and its static public key is A = g a . Similarly, the party Bob(B)'s static private key is b and its static public key is B = g b .
Protocol Description.
The protocol runs between Alice and Bob. Its description is given in Figure 1 .
1. Alice(Â) chooses an ephemeral private key x ∈ Z q at random, computes the ephemeral public key X = g x and sends X, c 1 = h(X) a toB. 2. Bob(B) chooses an ephemeral private key y ∈ Z q at random, computes the ephemeral public key Y = g y and sends B) x+a , sid), where sid = (Â,B, X, c 1 , Y, c 2 ). Then,Â keeps sk as the established session key..
= 1 If it does not verify, then aborts
If it does not verify, then aborts
where sid = (Â,B, X, c1, Y, c2) where sid = (Â,B, X, c1, Y, c2) 
Security Proof
Theorem 1. Suppose that the GDH assumption for group G holds, h, H are hash functions modeled as random oracles, then the proposed scheme in Fig. 1 is a secure authenticated key exchange protocol in the eCK model.
Proof. Assume that the adversary succeeds with non-negligible probability in the environment described in Appendix A. Following the standard approach, we use it to build an algorithm to solve GDH problem. The proof starts with the fact: Since the input to the key derivation function H(·) includes all exchanged information contained in sid and H is modeled as random oracle, we know that two different sessions necessarily have two different session keys, and the only way for the adversary to succeed is by computing the value GDH(XA, Y B), which is called forging attack. The rest of this section is mainly devoted to the analysis of the forging attack. According to freshness definition, we consider separately two complementary subcases below: CASE 1: No honest party owns a matching session to the Test session. CASE 2: The Test session has a matching session owned by another honest party.
The Analysis of CASE 1
In this case, it suffices to discuss the following two subcases: CASE 1.1: The adversary issues a StaticKeyReveal query on partyÂ and EphemeralKeyReveal query on partyB communicating with partyÂ (neither EphemeralKeyReveal query on the Test session nor StaticKeyReveal query on partyB is allowed).
CASE 1.2:
The adversary issues a EphemeralKeyReveal query on the Test session and EphemeralKeyReveal query on partyB communicating with partŷ A (neither StaticKeyReveal query on partyÂ nor StaticKeyReveal query on partyB is allowed). CASE 1.1: To show that the success probability of the adversary is negligible, we will construct a GDH problem solver SIM that uses an adversary M who succeeds with non-negligible probability in the attack.
Input to SIM. The input to the SIM is a GDH problem instance (U = g u , V = g v ), where u, v ∈ Z q and U, V ∈ G. The goal of SIM is to compute GDH(U, V ) = g uv .
Guessed Test session. SIM guesses the adversary M will select one party denoted byÂ as the owner of the Test session and the other party denoted byB as the peer. Further, SIM guesses the adversary M will select the session Π ŝ A,B
as the Test session. Note that the probability that the Test session is chosen by M is non-negligible. If this is not the case, SIM aborts.
Setup of SIM. SIM assigns static public key V forB, and random static public/private key pairs for the remaining parties (includingÂ). This way, SIM knows all static private keys of parties except forB.
Simulating the non-Test sessions. The adversary M can activate sessions between any two parties and insert its own messages into these sessions by either generating or scheduling the messages. The simulator SIM needs to respond the sessions on behalf of honest parties. Simulating the actions of any honest party other thanB is simple as SIM knows their static private keys. Assume that B is a responder andĈ is the peer, and the messages it receives is of the form X,c 1 allegedly fromĈ. WheneverB is activated in a session, SIM first verifies thatX ∈ G * and calls its DDH oracle to check if DDH(g, h(X), C,c 1 ) ? = 1. If so, SIM chooses an ephemeral private keyỹ ∈ Z q at random, computes ephemeral public keyỸ = gỹ, and sets h(Ỹ ) to be gr, wherer ∈ Z q . Then SIM sets the valuesỸ ,c 2 = Vr as the outgoing messages.
Response to the static private key and session key queries (non-Test session). SIM can respond the static private key queries on any party except forB. Likewise, session key queries for these sessions owned by any party other than B can be easily responded by SIM as it knows the corresponding static private keys and generates the ephemeral private keys itself. However, sessions in whicĥ B is a participant are problematic since SIM does not knowB's static private key.
Again, assume thatB is a responder and the peer isĈ. Since SIM does not knowsB's static private key , it can not generate the session key itself. To respond the session key queries and keep the consistency of the random oracles H, SIM calls DDH oracles to check if DDH(g,XC,Ỹ V, σ) ? = 1 where σ is the first element int H. Computing the forgery GDH(U, V ) = g uv . The goal of SIM is to compute GDH(U, V ) = g uv . Below we show that whenever the adversary M succeeds in the forging attack SIM can compute GDH(U, V ) = g uv . Assume that the outgoing message of the Test session is X = U, c 1 and the incoming message is Y, c 2 allegedly fromB. Indeed, to succeed in the forging attack it must be that the adversary M queries the first element of the form (Y B) x+a = (Y V ) u+a in H. In order to compute U v , the value Y must be eliminated (SIM knows the value a). However, without knowing y, this elimination seems difficult. Fortunately, it can be shown that the message Y cannot be generated by the adversary itself except with negligible probability. In other words, if there is an adversary who correctly generates a message Y, c 2 itself with non-negligible probability, we can construct a GDH problem solver SIM that uses the adversary. The action of SIM is as follows: With the input U, V , setting the static private key of partyB to be U , SIM responds the adversary's queries in the same way as SIM . 
This contradicts the GDH assumption.
In this case, since the adversary can issue neither StaticKeyReveal query on partyÂ nor staticKeyReveal query on partyB, SIM sets the static public keys of partyÂ andB to be U and V respectively. Simulating the actions of any honest parties other thanÂ andB is simple as SIM knows their static private keys. WheneverB (orÂ) is activated in a session, SIM acts like that of CASE 1.1 dealing with the queries on partyB.
Computing the forgery GDH(U, V ) = g uv . If the adversary succeeds in the forging attack, i.e., the adversary M queries the first element of the form (Y B) x+a = (Y V ) x+u in H. Note that the value X, Y is generated by the SIM itself as shown by SIM in CASE 1.1. Knowing x, y, the value GDH(U, V ) can be easily determined as follows (denote the first element in H by σ).
The Analysis of CASE 2
Compared to that of CASE 1 the proof for this case is simpler as there is a session matching to the Test session (i.e., the adversary neither generates the message itself nor delivers the message from other sessions towards the Test session). The simulations of partyÂ andB are similar to that of CASE 1. Due to space limitations, the details are left to the readers.
Further Security Properties

Resistance to reflection attacks.
In the security proof of section 4 we assume that partyÂ andB are different. In some scenarios, however, partyÂ wants to establish a session key with itself. For example, Alice with mobile device wants to establishes a secure channel with her office desktop computer where two devices uses the same certificate. An attack that exploits the fact the two parties use the same identity is called reflection attack in which the adversary simply copies partyÂ's outgoing message and sends back toÂ. We now prove that our protocol is secure against such attacks as follows. Input to SIM. The input to the SIM is a GDH problem instance (U = g u , V = g v ), where u, v ∈ Z q and U, V ∈ G. The goal of SIM is to compute GDH(U, V ) = g uv . SIM sets the static public key of partyÂ to be U . The simulation of partyÂ (initiator or responder) is similar to that of CASE 1.2 where SIM knows neither of the static private keys of two parties. Further, we assume that the outgoing message of the Test session is of the form X, c 1 and incoming message is of the formỸ ,c 2 .
1 As shown by SIM in CASE 1.1, however, the messageỸ ,c 2 can not be generated by the adversary itself except with negligible probability. In other words, it must be that SIM generates the valueỸ ,c 2 . By applying the similar argument in CASE 1.2 where SIM knows neither of the static private keys ofÂ andB, knowing the values x,ỹ we can transform an adversary into an algorithm which given U computes U u . Further, such algorithm can be used to solve the general GDH problem as observed by Maurer and Wolf [12] as said in [8] .
Proof of PFS Property
In the section, under the same GDH assumption, we prove that our protocol enjoys perfect forward security (PFS) against the active adversary. Our proof does not use any additional assumption, e.g. KEA1 assumption and is thus comparatively straightforward. To show that the success probability of the adversary M is negligible, we will construct a GDH problem solver SIM that uses an adversary M who succeeds with non-negligible probability in the attack. Input to SIM. The input to the SIM is a GDH problem instance (U = g u , V = g v ), where u, v ∈ Z q and U, V ∈ G. The goal of SIM is to compute GDH(U, V ) = g uv . Guessed Test session. SIM guesses the adversary M will select one party denoted byÂ as the owner of the Test session and the another party denoted byB as the peer. Further, SIM guesses the adversary M will select the session Π ŝ A,B
as Test session. Note that the probability that the Test session is chosen by M is non-negligible. If this is not the case, SIM aborts. Setup of SIM. According to the definition of PFS game, the adversary M can issue StaticKeyReveal query on neither partyÂ nor partyB before the Test session is complete. However, M is allowed to reveal the static private keys of partyÂ andB after the Test session is complete. To deal with StaticKeyReveal query, SIM assigns random static public/private key pairs for all the parties (includingÂ andB) itself. This way, SIM knows all the static private keys of parties. Simulating the non-Test sessions. Simulating the actions of any honest party other thanB is simple as SIM knows their static private keys. On the other hand, to solve the GDH problem, the GDH instance U, V must be embedded into the outgoing and incoming messages of Test session. As the adversary is an active attacker in the PFS game, i.e, the incoming message of the Test session may be generated or scheduled from other sessions of partyB, the simulation of partyB is slightly different. Assume thatB is a responder andĈ is the peer, and the messagesB receives is of the formX,c 1 allegedly fromĈ. WheneverB is activated in a session, SIM first verifies thatX ∈ G * and calls its DDH oracle to check if DDH(g, h(X), C,c 1 ) Computing the forgery GDH(U, V ) = g uv . The goal of SIM is to compute GDH(U, V ) = g uv . Below we show that whenever the adversary M succeeds in the forging attack SIM can compute GDH(U, V ) = g uv . Assume that the outgoing message of the Test session is U, c 1 and the incoming message is Y, c 2 allegedly fromB. As shown by SIM in CASE 1.1, the message Y, c 2 can not be generated by the adversary itself except with negligible probability. Thus, it must be that the message Y, c 2 have been scheduled by the adversary from other sessions of partyB. That is to say, the value Y, c 2 has been generated by SIM itself with the form Y = V ti and c 2 = h(Y ) b . Denote the first element in H by σ. With value t i , SIM proceeds as follows.
Comparison of Protocols
In Table 1 we compare our protocol with several popular AKE protocols in term of efficiency, security model and underlying hardness assumptions. For simplicity, we do not take into account subgroup validation and speedup trick that may be applicable. The "E" denote the exponentiation in G and "E N " denote the exponentiation in the RSA group. Compared with the NAXOS, CMQV and HMQV protocols, all of which only achieve weak perfect forward security (wPFS), the main advantage of our scheme is that it achieves perfect forward security (PFS). On the other hand, to be secure in the eCK model the former two protocols use the NAXOS transformation while our scheme does not. Compared with HMQV-C protocol which achieves perfect forward security (PFS), our scheme has lower round complexity (within one round). While mOT protocol achieves perfect forward security (PFS) within one round, it does not resist the ephemeral key query, i.e, mOT is insecure in eCK model. Compared to it, our scheme is provably secure in eCK model and meanwhile achieves perfect forward security (PFS).
Conclusions and Open Problem
Although there have already been some two-pass AKE protocols provably secure in the eCK model, none of them achieve perfect forward security against active adversary. On the other hand, while mOT protocol achieves PFS security against active adversary within one round, it is not secure against the ephemeral key query attack, i.e, insecure in the eCK model. This paper proposes a new two-pass (one round) authenticated key exchange protocol in eCK model with PFS property. Our protocol provably enjoys following desirable properties. First , without the NAXOS transformation our protocol is shown secure in the eCK model under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. Second, under the same assumption, we prove that our two-pass (one round) protocol achieves perfect forward security against active adversary.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first two-pass (one round) AKE protocol which is provably secure in the eCK model and achieves perfect forward security against active adversary. Finally, while our work takes provably secure AKE protocol further, our protocol needs two group element per message. The design of the AKE protocol provably secure in the eCK model without NAXOS transformation and achieving PFS in one round (a single group element per message) remains an open problem.
